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We analyze empirically the role played by energy inflation as a determinant of downward 
corrections in house prices. Using a dataset for 18 OECD economies spanning the last four 
decades, we identify periods of downward house price adjustment and estimate conditional 
logit models to measure the effect of energy inflation on the probability of these house price 
corrections after controlling for other relevant macroeconomic variables. Our results give 
strong evidence that increases in energy price inflation raise the probability of such corrective 
periods taking place. This phenomenon could be explained by various channels: through the 
adverse effects of energy prices on economic activity and income reducing the demand for 
housing; through the particular impact on construction and operation costs and their effects on 
the supply and demand of housing; through the reaction of monetary policy on inflation 
withdrawing liquidity and further reducing demand; through improving attractiveness of 
commodity versus housing investment on asset markets; or through a lagging impact of 
common factors on both variables, such as economic growth. Our results contribute to the 
understanding of the pass-through of oil price shocks to financial markets and imply that energy 
price inflation should serve as a leading indicator for the analysis of macro-financial risks.  
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Was it mere coincidence that the global financial crisis 2007-2009 occurred in proximity to 
an oil shock? Between 2000 and mid-2008, the price of crude oil surged fivefold to an all-
time high of around USD 145 per barrel. Already one year before this peak the US subprime 
mortgage crisis emerged, which led to the most severe financial crisis since the Great 
Depression (Bernanke, 2010) and a truly global recession. Kaufmann et al. (2011) postulate a 
direct role for energy prices in the 2008 financial crisis. Using cointegration methods, they 
identify a significant long-run relationship between household expenditures on energy and 
US mortgage delinquency rates. 2  Earlier research has already acknowledged that both 
housing price corrections and energy price volatility are important determinants of recessions. 
Leamer (2007) calculates that eight out of ten post-war recessions in the USA followed 
shocks in the housing sector.3 According to Hamilton (2005), nine of these ten US recessions 
were preceded by oil price shocks. With the recent Great Recession the relation to housing 
price corrections gets augmented to 11 : 9 and to oil price shocks to 11 : 10 (Hamilton, 2010).  
Inspection of historical data gives already a first illustration of the relationship between 
energy and real estate markets. Figure 1 presents the annual development of real house and 
crude oil prices in the US between 1890 and 2009. The correlation is not extraordinary strong 
over the whole period (0.52) but increases significantly during the last two decades. 4 The 
correlation between the post-1990 real oil price index and the real house price index in the 
US is 0.72 and it increases to 0.93 between 2000 and 2006. Remarkable – from today's 
perspective – are the modest drops of housing prices just in the initial phase of the two big oil 
shocks of the past century (starting in 1972 and 1979) and after the first gulf war (1990/1). In 
the period of oil price increases preceding the recent financial crisis, house prices accelerated 
                                                 
2
 Campbell and Cocco (2011) show that adjustable-rate mortgages default tends to occur when inflation (which 
in the short-run is energy price driven) and nominal interest rates are high. 
3
 In its analysis of 19 advanced industrialized economies, IMF (2003) find that between 1970 and 2002 
recessions tended to happen after an housing price bust, which all were followed by banking crisis.  
4
 The correlation of nominal house and crude oil prices is significantly higher (0.89). The use of real crude oil 
price data is convention in economic studies, although the typically high weight of energy prices in inflation 
would justify the use of nominal data.  
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in 1997 – one year before the oil price boom. Similarly, house prices already started to 
decline in 2006, two years before the crash of crude oil prices.  
Figure 1: Annual US house prices and crude oil prices, 1890-2009 
 
 
Comparable data on the euro area are only available since the mid-1980s. Figure 2 shows the 
development of deflated quarterly housing and euro-denominated crude oil prices. The 
correlation between both series amounts to 0.76 for the period starting in 1985 and 0.83, if we 
compute it for the pre-crisis period starting in 1990. As with the US, the recent oil price boom 
coincided with a housing boom in some euro area countries (especially Ireland and Spain, 
where the boom was fostered by a spectacular fall of risk premia after the introduction of the 
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Figure 2: Quarterly euro area house price index and crude oil price index 
 
 
The US and European experience indicate that a deeper analysis of the interplay between the 
commodity and real estate market may shed light on the nature of house price correction 
episodes. In our study, we go beyond case studies and focus on the interaction of energy and 
house price developments in a panel of advanced economies since the first oil shock. In 
particular, we assess empirically the role played by energy inflation as a determinant of 
downward corrections in house prices.  
The literature identifies various channels underlying this relationship: (i) The adverse direct 
and indirect effects of energy prices hikes on disposable income and expenditures of 
households dampening the demand for housing – essentially an income effect (Spencer et al., 
2008); (ii) the direct and indirect effects of energy price increases on construction and 
operational building costs which lead to quantity and price adjustments on the supply side; 
(iii) the tightening reaction of monetary policy on the pressure induced by energy price 
increases on headline inflation which first withdraws liquidity from the housing market and 
second reduces aggregated demand including that for housing (Luciani, 2010); (iv) the 
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housing on asset markets (Basu and Gavin, 2010); (v) the lagging impact of third common 
factors on both variables, such as economic growth and monetary policy.  
We use a panel of quarterly OECD data which spans over the period 1971-2008 for 18 OECD 
member countries to test empirically whether changes in energy prices affect the probability 
of house price adjustments. We control for a variety of relevant monetary, macroeconomic, 
housing market specific and demographic variables and account for misalignment of housing 
prices from an estimated fundamental value. Our results confirm that changes in energy 
inflation have a robust effect on house prices and in particular on the probability of 
downward corrections. To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess this issue in a 
rigorous econometric setting using longitudinal information from a broad group of 
economies. Such an empirical strategy is particularly justified by the fact that house price 
busts are often – but certainly not always – cross-border synchronized, presumably reflecting 
synchronization of monetary policy, financial deregulation and business cycles (IMF, 2003). 
In turn, energy price inflation is to a large extent determined by international oil price 
developments, although rigidities in the pass-through of oil price shocks at the national level 
may lead to sizeable differences in energy price dynamics across economies. 
While the leading indicator quality of energy price inflation found in our study does not 
exclude feedback effects in the opposite direction, the robustness and magnitude of the effect 
of energy price inflation on house prices makes it relevant for policy considerations. 
Assessing risks to price stability, energy prices are already well recognized as the most 
important component of headline inflation volatility (ECB, 2010). Our findings imply that 
monitoring of energy price developments should also be an important task for financial 
market regulators and central banks in the framework of macro-financial risk assessment.5 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature 
and considers a few theoretical aspects. Section 3 tests our hypothesis empirically. Section 4 
interprets the results and draws policy conclusions. 
                                                 
5
 In early 2012 Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, started to publish a new house price index 
for its Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) Scoreboard. This set of indicators provides the basis for the 
economic reading of potential imbalances identified by the European Commission in its new annual Alert 
Mechanism Report. Apart from that Eurostat also runs pilot studies to capture price developments of owner-




2 Oil prices and house prices: Theoretical linkages  
Several channels linking oil price developments and house prices have been identified in the 
literature. In this section we summarize the existing theoretical frameworks related to such a 
linkage. We build our survey about such mechanisms around the following channels: (i) an 
income and demand channel, (ii) an energy related building cost channel, (iii) a monetary 
policy channel, (iv) an asset price channel, and (v) via reversed causality or omitted factors.  
(i) Income and demand channel 
Energy price inflation tends to reduce aggregate demand, and in particular housing demand. 
This impact can be disentangled into a terms-of-trade effect, a demand-side and a supply-side 
effect (ECB, 2010). First, the effect of oil price increases on terms of trade leads to a 
reduction in purchasing power and wealth of households. Notwithstanding possible 
adjustments of the saving rate, this would entail a reduction in consumption and (housing) 
investment. Second, aggregated demand-side effects arise from inflation and its impact on 
real income. Ideally, under perfect competition in labour and product markets, rising energy 
prices would only lead to a relative price change, which could be compensated through 
substitution for less energy-intensive demand. Rigidities, however, imply that energy prices 
feed into headline inflation through first and second round effects. Third, supply-side effects 
relate to the input costs of production. In the short-run, firms may react by either reducing 
their profits or increase output prices, which in turn implies a reduction of consumption and 
quantities produced. In the long-run, they would tend to substitute away from energy 
intensive inputs. The mechanisms described above can be used to (at least partly) explain the 
correlation between household expenditures on energy and US mortgage delinquency rates in 
Kaufmann et al. (2011). The increase in the inventory of houses for sale triggered by such a 
linkage would, in turn, depress their prices, thus reinforcing the effects described.  
Taken together, all these effects of oil price increases tend to depress income via decreased 
purchasing power, profit squeeze and increasing unemployment. Hamilton (2009) as well as 
Rubin and Buchanan (2008) explain the Great Recession as a result of oil price shocks, which 
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eventually contributed to bust the “house price bubble”6 and triggered the financial crisis.7 
Due to the fact that the response of household spending not only reflects unanticipated 
income changes but also a deterioration of consumer confidence leading to precautionary 
savings (mainly at the cost of durables), the impact of an energy price shock on consumption 
and housing investment is expected to be even higher than that on overall GDP (Edelstein 
and Kilian 2009). Hamilton (2009) also argues that the recessionary effects of the oil shock 
on income and unemployment depresses housing demand overproportionally. Such results 
are in line with the high energy price elasticity estimates for residential investment 
expenditures reported by Kilian (2008) that lead him to conclude that “energy price shocks 
make themselves felt primarily through reduced demand for cars and new houses” (Kilian 
2008, p. 889).  
Microeconomic arguments which stress this connection have been put forward in the recent 
literature. Relative to overall consumption, Cortright (2008) argues that fuel price increases 
were at least partly responsible for the bursting of the recent US housing bubble and presents 
evidence concerning the fact that house price declines were more severe in distant suburbs 
that require lengthy commutes. The effect of gas prices on the demand for distant suburban 
housing, reducing relative house prices in remote metropolitan areas, is thus put forward as a 
mechanism linking oil price shocks to the end of the house price bubble.8  
(ii) Energy related building cost channel 
Construction, maintenance and operation of buildings need energy. On the one hand, the 
embodied energy is used for the extraction, processing and transport of building materials9 as 
                                                 
6
 The term “house price bubble” is widely accepted in the context of the most recent crisis (see e.g. Bernanke, 
2010). Nevertheless, being aware of the general controversy over the term (Lind, 2009), we prefer to use the 
merely quantitative concept of “house price corrections”. 
7
 Explanations of recent global macroeconomic developments based on chronologies related to oil price changes 
are also put forward by Kilian (2009), Huntington (2005), Blanchard and Galí (2008) and Ramey and Vine 
(2010). 
8
 Ramey and Vine (2010) summarize the adjustment behaviour of households in the US after permanent fuel 
price upsurges, first by reducing travel distances and in the longer run by revising their decision on where to live 
and work. 
9




well as construction, maintenance and repair of the building. On the other hand, the 
operational energy is used in providing the building services (heating, cooling, etc.) over its 
lifetime10. This residential sector accounts for a quarter of overall energy consumption in 
industrialized countries (Swan and Urgusal, 2009). Hence, the presumably negative effect of 
rising energy costs on housing demand and real estate prices can be sizable.11 Quigley (1984) 
regards the production of housing service flows (i.e. the services households derive from the 
dwellings they inhabit) and considers the demand for residential energy as a factor input. 
Using production and demand functions for housing services, he estimates i.a. the elasticity 
of substitution between operating inputs (largely energy) and real estate to be about 0.3. 
According to those estimates, a doubling of energy prices is associated with an 11-15% 
increase in the price of housing services, a decline of 7-10% in the demand for housing, and a 
small increase in housing expenditures.  
(iii) Monetary policy channel 
To the extent that energy price increases are passed through to medium-term headline or core 
inflation, they may cause a restrictive monetary policy reaction. Higher interest rates have a 
dampening effect on economic activity and household income, which tends to hit residential 
investment over-proportionally (see the evidence in Edelstein and Kilian (2009)). Tight 
monetary policy also reduces the inflow of liquidity to the housing sector just as low interest 
rates tend to inflate house prices. Barsky and Kilian (2002) hold exogenous changes in 
monetary policy chiefly responsible for historical stagflation episodes, which coincided with 
the rise in oil prices. In addition, IMF (2008) suggests that house prices have become more 
responsive to monetary policy innovations as a consequence of (flexible rate) mortgage 
deregulation. With regard to residential investment, however, the impact of monetary policy 
innovations has decreased since the mid-1980s, particularly in the US. Hence, more flexible 
and developed housing finance appears to favour monetary policy transmission through 
prices rather than investment in houses.  
                                                 
10
 The embodied energy accounts typically for between a sixth and a third of the total life-time energy 
consumption (Building Commission, 2006).  
11
 According to our back-of-the-envelope calculation (based on data from BP, US Census Bureau and Building 
Commission, 2006) total lifecycle energy costs of a typical one-family house in the US in relation to the 
respective total construction costs may have increased from below 6% of in 2004 to more than 9% in 2006 and 
around 15.5% in 2008. 
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(iv) Financial market channel 
Energy and housing-related securities compete for investment on asset markets. Increasing 
energy prices attract investment to commodity producers that could otherwise flow into the 
housing sector. Both asset markets serve as a hedge against inflation and safe haven when 
inflation expectations are rising. Caballero et al. (2008) and El–Gamal and Jaffe (2010) 
provide a narrative of the evolution of the US house price boom as a consequence of 
petrodollar recycling in the years before the subprime crisis.12 Rapid growth of emerging 
economies and the associated rise in commodity prices induced capital flows from emerging 
markets toward the US in search for (apparently) sound and liquid financial instruments (see 
also Higgins et al., 2006). The exceptionally strong negative correlation between oil and 
stock prices between July 2007 and June 2008 is put forward by Caballero et al. (2008) as 
evidence for this interaction. After the burst of the housing bubble, the interaction between 
housing, energy and financial markets continues to play an important role in explaining 
current global developments. The crash exacerbated the scarcity of assets leading to a large 
positive demand shock (which has sometimes been identified as a new bubble)13 in the oil 
market, as well as markets for other commodities.  
(v) Omitted factors or reversed causality  
Global liquidity, monetary policy, regulation and supervision of financial markets, as well as 
overall cyclical dynamics may impact both energy and house prices, thus leading to joint 
developments of these variables that may appear causal but are actually created by such a 
third factor. Globally accommodative monetary conditions have been documented as a factor 
driving commodity prices (Frankel, 2008) through a complex transmission mechanism. The 
interest rate channel, on the one hand, affects commodity prices through its effect on 
aggregate demand, inflation and incentives for producers to postpone extraction. The asset 
market channel, on the other hand, changes incentives for financial market participants with 
regard to risks or term structure, encouraging thus portfolio shifts or commodity carry trade 
                                                 
12
 Looking at headline inflation in the US of the 1970s Piazzesi and Schneider (2012) show that the oil shock 
driven Great Inflation induced a portfolio shift by making housing more attractive than equity. 
13
 While there seems to be a consensus that the subprime crisis has been preceded by a housing bubble the 
notion of an "oil price bubble" has been much more disputed (Krugman, 2008) although some research would 
indeed suggest that oil price boom until 2008 went beyond fundamentals (Kaufmann, 2010).  
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(G-20, 2011). 14  Monetary conditions, on the other hand, also impact real estate prices. 
Utilizing structural VARs for several small open economies, Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2009) 
present empirical evidence concerning the increasing role of house prices in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Goodhart and Hoffman (2008) find evidence of a multidirectional 
link between house prices, monetary variables and other macroeconomic variables. Such 
results stand in contrast with those in Bernanke (2010), who finds that the direct linkages 
between monetary policy and house price changes in the early part of the last decade were 
weak. 
Global demand certainly plays an important role for oil price developments (Hamilton 2009; 
Kilian, 2009). This demand could originate from house price wealth effects – as expressed by 
Leamer (2007), who states that "housing is the business cycle". The popular account of 
financial crises by Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) also stresses the disastrous long-term impact 
of real estate crashes on the economy. Spillovers from the housing sector to the rest of the 
economy have widened through changes in housing finance systems in OECD economies 
over the past two decades by supporting the use of housing as collateral (IMF, 2008).  
3 Empirical analysis 
In this section we assess empirically the role played by energy price inflation as a 
determinant of house price corrections using a panel dataset spanning information for 18 
OECD economies for the period 1971-2010 at a quarterly frequency. 15 Before concentrating 
on explaining turning points in house prices, we analyze the role played by energy price 
inflation as a determinant of overall house price dynamics. 
We start by estimating panel regression models where house price inflation is assumed to 
depend on its own lag, energy price inflation and other determinants, 
                                                 
14
 Identifying these channels empirically and designating causalities is not trivial. Using a VAR model, Anzuini 
et al. (2010) present empirical evidence of a significant but weak relationship between an expansionary US 
monetary policy shocks and rising commodity prices. Erceg et al (2012), using their multi-country model 
SIGMA, show that "easy money in the dollar bloc" leads to a transitory run-up in oil prices. 
15
 The countries in our sample are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, US and UK. 
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+   +  ,    (1) 
 
where ∆  and ∆  denote house price inflation and energy price inflation, respectively, 
while   is a vector summarizing other determinants of house price changes. The error term,  
 , is assumed to be composed by a country fixed effect, a year fixed effect and a random 
shock which is assumed to fulfil the standard assumptions required in linear regression 
models. For the vector  , we choose variables which proxy monetary policy and credit 
developments (credit growth, interest rate changes), macroeconomic fundamentals (GDP per 
capita growth), housing market variables (investment in housing, home ownership rates) and 
demographic dynamics (share of working age population, population growth).  
The results of the estimation of different specifications of equation (1) are presented in Table 
1.16 In order to assess the unconditional within-country correlation between house price and 
energy price changes, we start by regressing house price inflation on energy price inflation in 
a specification which includes country and year fixed effects (see column 1 in Table 1). This 
model reveals a significant negative association between the two variables, with a (within-
country) standard deviation change in energy price inflation (equal to 6.2 percentage points) 
being related to a decrease of approximately 0.44 percentage points in house price inflation. 
The negative relationship remains significant if we control for the persistence observed in 
house price inflation by including the lagged dependent variable as an extra regressor in the 
model (see column 2 of Table 1). Controlling for other determinants of house price inflation 
does not affect the negative and significant association and unveils how other factors relate to 
house price inflation dynamics. Increases in credit, GDP per capita and population growth 
appear positively related to house price inflation, as would be expected from theory. The 
apparently counterintuitive positive partial correlation between house price inflation and the 
current account balance can be explained by the convergent dynamics observed in this 
variable over the sample period. On average, for our panel dataset, there is a robust negative 
correlation between the change in the current account balance and its level, indicating that the 
                                                 
16
 The fact that the time dimension in the panel clearly dominates the cross-section dimension implies that we do 




largest positive changes tended to happen in countries with relatively sizeable current account 
deficits, where house prices also increased more rapidly. 
Table 1: House price and energy price inflation, panel data regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Energy price inflation -0.0711*** -0.0427*** -0.0236** 
[0.0148] [0.00909] [0.00941] 
Lagged house price 
inflation 0.488*** 0.435*** 
[0.0687] [0.0585] 
Credit growth 0.0222** 
[0.0103] 
Real interest rate change -0.0293 
[0.0168] 
GDP per capita growth 0.212*** 
[0.0333] 
Current account balance 0.0550*** 
[0.0167] 
Investment in housing -0.0608 
[0.0732] 
Home ownership rate 
change 0.0168 
[0.259] 
Share of working age pop. -0.0236 
[0.0297] 







Observations 2,636 2,626 1,579 
R-squared (within) 0.229 0.415 0.503 
The dependent variable is house price inflation. Country and year fixed effects included in 
all specifications. Robust standard errors in brackets. *(**)[***] stands for significance at 
the 10% (5%)[1%] level. 
The results show an overall robust negative partial correlation between energy price inflation 
and house price inflation that gives some indication that increases in energy prices may have 
contributed to the burst of house price bubbles in the past decades. However, an analysis that 
aims at directly quantifying the contribution of energy prices to downward corrections in 
house prices requires a different type of specification based on the identification of such 
bubble burst periods and the specification of models which assess the effect of energy prices 
on their occurrence probability.     
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Since the dependent variable of such an analysis (the occurrence of a price reversal) is of a 
binary nature, we use conditional logit specifications to model the process of house price 
reversals in our panel. The use of conditional logit models allows for the inclusion of 
country-specific, time invariant factors which control for fixed unobservable factors which 











 ,    (2) 
where yit takes value one if period t is a house price upward trend reversal period in country i 
and zero otherwise and Xit is a vector of determinants of house price reversals. Conditional 
logit models of the type put forward in equation (2) can be estimated in a straightforward 
manner using maximum likelihood methods (see Chamberlain, 1980).  
Answering our research question requires the identification of turning points in house price 
data and the definition of periods corresponding to the price reversal. The recent empirical 
literature on asset price bubbles (see Gerdesmeier et al., 2009, and Crespo Cuaresma, 2010) 
follows variants of the approach proposed by Bry and Boschan (1971) in order to identify 
peaks and troughs in house price data, which are used to date house price reversals. Starting 
with the series of real house prices for a given country, pt, we define an observation as a 
potential peak if it is a local maximum in a 6-quarter period (that is, pt-j< pt > pt+k  for 
j=1,…,3). Local minima are identified in a similar way and we impose a minimum length for 
peak-to-trough/trough-to-peak phases of two quarters, as well as for full peak-to-peak and 
trough-to-trough cycles of three years. Such a requirement ensures that our identified turning 
points are not exclusively due to short-lived volatility in real estate prices. Following this 
identification procedure, we define a house price reversal as the period corresponding to a 
downward correction in house prices, as well as the previous and following quarter.17 The 
dependent variable in our empirical model takes value one if the observation corresponds to a 
correction period in the corresponding country, and zero otherwise. Table 2 presents the dates 
corresponding to the identified house price turning points in the dataset. The procedure does 
                                                 
17
 We define the correction period as in Crespo Cuaresma (2010), allowing thus for a certain degree of 
flexibility in identifying the actual starting point of the correction episode. In particular, the correction period is 
assumed to start one quarter before the peak (when the downward price pressures are supposed to be dominant), 
and last until the first quarter where such pressures are realized by the decrease in house prices.   
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not detect any turning point in the house price series for Japan and the Netherlands, which are 
therefore not included in the sample used to estimate the econometric models. 
Table 2: Identified turning point dates for house prices 
Australia 1982Q1 1994Q4 UK 1973Q4 
1985Q4 2004Q1 1980Q4 
1989Q2 1989Q4 
Canada 1981Q4 Ireland 1972Q3 2001Q2 
1991Q3 1984Q1 
1994Q3 1992Q1 
Switzerland 1990Q1 Italy 1981Q2 
2004Q4 1992Q4 
Germany 1981Q3 1999Q3 Korea 1991Q3 
1986Q4 2003Q4 
1995Q1 
Denmark 1973Q4 Norway 1977Q2 
1979Q3 1987Q3 
1987Q1 2007Q4 
Spain 1974Q4 New Zealand 1984Q3 
1978Q3 1990Q2 
1992Q1 1999Q3 
Finland 1974Q3 2000Q2 Sweden 1979Q4 
1984Q4 1990Q2 
1989Q2 1994Q4 




In a first descriptive approach to the relationship investigated, Figure 3 presents the frequency 
of house price correction periods in our group of countries against aggregate energy price 
inflation in the OECD. Downward adjustments in house prices appear to be more frequent 
around the oil shock in 1974, in 1981, during 1991, when the first Gulf War took place, and 
particularly at the end of the period considered. 18 Most cases of house price corrections (9 
                                                 
18
 Unlike in the econometric exercise, for the creation of Figure 3 the definition criteria for housing price 
corrections were softened at the end of the period under examination in order to capture the adjustments that 
took place during the financial crisis. In particular, the minimal requirements concerning the length of a full 
peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough phase were dropped for the latest years, so as to be able to identify also (partly 
unfinished) corrections since 2007. 
 and 10 occurrences, respectively) occur
2008. 
Figure 3: Energy price inflation (left axis) and house price adjustments (frequency, 
right axis), OECD countries 1971
As the main determinant of house price reversals, we obtain measures of 
house price misalignment making use of cointegration analysi
(Stock and Watson, 1993)), we estimate recursively cointegration regressions linking house 
prices with income per capita and 
price data from the estimated long
period in time, we obtain long
real interest rates (long term interest rates deflated by CPI inflation) by estimating a 
cointegration relationship enhanced with leads and lags of the right
for the estimation of the cointegration 
except Germany and Korea, and the first misalignment estimate is obtained for the 
observation corresponding to the first quarter of 1975 (1990 for Korea and 1995 for 
Germany). The sample is then expanded quarter by quarter to obtain misalignment estimates 
based exclusively on past information. With the exception of Germany and Korea, for which 
only a shorter sample is available, all countries present the expected signs in the long
elasticities, although there are remarkable differences in the absolute value of the parameters 
red in the last quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 
-2010 
s. Using Dynamic OLS (DOLS
real long-term interest rates and use the deviation of house 
-run relationship as a measure of misalignment. 
-run elasticities of real prices to changes in GDP per capita and 
-hand-side variables. Data 
relationship ranges back to 1971
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attached to the interest rate variable across countries.19 In addition, estimating standard error 
correction models leads to significant adjustment to the long-run equilibrium for all countries 
in our sample. The largest misalignment are found for the UK and New Zealand in the period 
2004-2007 (where prices are estimated to deviate from the corresponding equilibrium by 
about 50 percent) and for Spain in the eighties (with misalignments of around 45 percent).  
In addition to energy price inflation, which is the central variable in our analysis, other 
determinants of house price bubble bursts have been proposed in the literature and are added 
to our set of covariates on the right hand side of equation (2). Table 3 presents the estimation 
results of conditional logit models of the form presented in equation (2) for different choices 
of control variables. All specifications include decadal dummies and all explanatory variables 
are lagged one quarter in order to ensure Granger-causal effects from the explanatory 
variables. The first column of Table 3 presents the results from a bivariate model where the 
probability of house price reversals is assumed to depend exclusively on energy price 
inflation. In this simple setting, the results of the estimate indicate that increases in energy 
price inflation augment significantly the probability of a price reversal. In this simple model 
the average marginal effect of energy price inflation (evaluated assuming that the country 
fixed effect equals zero) is 0.550, with a standard deviation of 0.0252. The effect of changes 
in energy price inflation on the probability of house price adjustments is thus not only 
statistically significant, but also sizable. Column 2 of Table 3 expands this simple 
specification by adding the house price misalignment variable as a covariate in the model. As 
expected, the parameter associated to this variable is estimated to be positive and highly 
significant, indicating that as house prices increase above their equilibrium level the 
probability of a price reversal becomes higher.  The effect of energy price inflation remains 
positive and significant after controlling for the misalignment level.  
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 The estimated long-run elasticities which are used to obtain the measure of house price misalignments are 
presented in the Appendix, together with the source and descriptive statistics of all variables used in the 
econometric specifications.  
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Table 3: Estimation results for conditional logit models of house price reversals 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Energy price inflation 2.488** 3.810** 4.327*** 3.769* 3.386** 3.555* 3.414** 
 
[1.213] [1.564] [1.572] [2.014] [1.716] [2.055] [1.697] 
Misalignment  7.441*** 7.434*** 7.203*** 7.811*** 8.951*** 7.852*** 
 
 [1.890] [1.319] [1.714] [1.733] [1.074] [1.724] 
Credit growth   1.77   3.191  
 
  [2.982]   [2.893]  
Real interest rate change   5.656   2.094  
 
  [5.024]   [4.254]  
GDP per capita growth   -6.829   -9.648  
 
  [7.870]   [7.945]  
Current account balance   -1.471   -3.391  
 
  [7.266]   [7.835]  
Investment in housing    0.836  2.609  
 
   [18.29]  [30.22]  
Home ownership rate change    17.48    
 
   [25.51]    
Share of working age pop.     -16.32* -42.56* -16.26* 
 
    [9.366] [18.73] [9.312] 
Population growth     9.264 -9.214  
 
    [54.41] [82.61]  
Observations 2,089 1,911 1,668 1,401 1,911 1,608 1,911 
Pseudo-R2 0.0274 0.0911 0.113 0.0901 0.0934 0.133 0.116 
Conditional logit estimates. The dependent binary variable equals one in house price burst periods. Robust standard errors  




In column 3 of Table 3, in addition to our misalignment measure we add a group of economic 
variables as controls in the model which have been proposed in the literature to account for 
the effect of liquidity and monetary policy measures as well as income developments and 
external imbalances. As expected, the misalignment variable is positively related to house 
price corrections, but none of the additional variables appears to be a robust determinant of 
price reversals in house prices, while the effect of energy price inflation dynamics is still 
present when controlling for them. The same is true if we control instead for housing 
investment and home ownership, which do not appear to be systematic drivers of house price 
reversals (see column 4). In column 5 we include two demographic variables in the model: 
the share of working age population and the rate of growth of total population. These 
variables account for potential effects of changes in the age structure of the population on the 
demand for housing. Their inclusion does not affect the importance of energy prices and 
misalignments as determinants of house price reversals. Furthermore, age structure dynamics 
as captured by the share of working age population, potentially related to the probability of 
experiencing turning points in house prices. Finally, the last column in Table 3 presents our 
preferred model, where only significant variables from the specifications tried are considered. 
The estimates of this model reaffirm the role of energy prices as an explanatory factor of 
house price dynamics. The models estimated imply a marginal effect of energy price inflation 
on the reversal probability between 0.5 and 0.6, depending on the specification used. This 
implies that a 1 percentage point change in energy price inflation rates increases the 
probability of a house price reversal by 0.5 to 0.6 percentage points.   
Several checks were carried out to ensure the robustness of our results. If contemporary 
variables are considered instead of lagged covariates, the results presented in Table 3 are left 
qualitatively unchanged, while the change in the real short term interest rate appears to be 
significantly and positively related to turning point probabilities. The results for this variable, 
which is meant to capture the role of monetary policy actions, indicate that monetary 
tightening tends to be related to house price corrections, although establishing a causal 
relationship between the two would require a more in-depth analysis that falls beyond the 
scope of this study. We also reestimate the model using subsamples based on excluding 
individual countries from the sample, which leads to some variation in the estimated 
19 
 
parameter but does not change the qualitative results described above concerning the effect of 
energy price inflation on the probability of house price corrections.20    
In Table 4 we present the results of further robustness checks based on changing the 
definition of our dependent variable. In the first column of Table 4 we present the benchmark 
results obtained with the original dependent variables and our preferred specification which 
contains exclusively statistically significant parameters (column 7 in Table 3). We redefine 
the turning point estimation method by using more restrictive conditions in order to qualify as 
a turning point. In particular, we impose a minimum length for peak-to-trough/trough-to-peak 
phases of one year (instead of two quarters), as well as for full peak-to-peak and trough-to-
trough cycles of four years (instead of three), and estimate the model based on this 
identification procedure. The parameter estimates for this new variable are presented in the 
second column of Table 3 and confirm the results of our original analysis. In column 3 of 
Table 4 we estimate the model after redefining the price correction episodes. Instead of using 
a definition based on the turning point together with the previous and following quarter, we 
use alternative definitions based on the turning point and (exclusively) the previous quarter 
(presented in column 3 of Table 4), as well as on the turning point and (exclusively) the 
following quarter (column 4 of Table 4). The results are not qualitatively affected by these 
changes in the definition of the corrective period and confirm the role played by energy price 
inflation as a determinant of house price corrections. 
 
Benchmark 
More restrictive turning  
point definition 
Turning point +  
previous quarter 
Turning point +  
following quarter 



































































Conditional logit estimates. The dependent binary variable equals one in house price burst periods. Robust standard errors 
clustered by country in brackets. Decadal dummies included in all models. 
                                                 
20
 Figure A2 in the Appendix summarizes the results of this robustness exercise. 
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4 Concluding remarks 
This study empirically demonstrates a systematic relationship between energy and real estate 
markets. The results of our analysis of 18 OECD countries over a period of 37 years confirm 
the hypothesis that energy price inflation has significant leading indicator properties for 
correction dynamics in house prices. Our estimated models imply that deviations from 
fundamental-driven house prices play a significant role in such price corrections and thus 
energy price inflation can be seen as playing a role in the bursting of house price bubbles. 
Even without straightforward evidence of causality beyond the time lag structure used in the 
specifications, we conclude from our results that energy price inflation can be considered an 
important indicator not only for assessing challenges to price stability but also for financial 
market stability.  
Future research focused on the interactions of energy and real estate markets in the housing 
boom phase appears important, as does a more systematic analysis of the reversed effect of 
property price corrections on commodity price developments. Establishing an unequivocal 
case for causality would probably require a thorough investigation of the channels sketched 
in our study – a quite ambitious undertaking given the various cross-linkages involved. 
Progress on this research agenda would provide inputs for the discussion on macro-financial 
policies.  
Various options are debated in order to minimize the probability or costs of excessive asset 
price boom and bust cycles: (i) doing nothing and “cleaning up the mess” once the bubbles 
burst; (ii) “leaning against the wind” via restrictive monetary policy; (iii) pursuing 
contractionary fiscal policy and building up fiscal buffers; (iv) applying macro-prudential 
measures to control household lending and improve bank resilience (Bernanke, 2010; Praet, 
2010); (v) reforming regulation on the underlying real estate markets. 21 Our results suggest 
that understanding the structure of energy markets might be particularly important for 
monetary authorities as lower energy price volatility (G-20, 2011) and reduced energy 
intensity (ECB, 2010) are important factors facilitating prudential macroeconomic policies. 
                                                 
21
 Repealing mortgage deregulation and preferential (tax) treatment of homeownership could reduce house price 
volatility and hence the risks to macroeconomic stability (Andrews, et al., 2011). Chinese authorities, for 
instance, used farther-reaching regulatory measures to curb housing markets in recent years (Clemens et al., 
2011). Furthermore, redirecting (zoning) policies towards “walkable cities” could also dampen the proliferation 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical models 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source 
House price correction period 2273 0.063 0.244 0.000 1.000 
Own calculations based on OECD 
data for house price indices 
Energy price inflation 2681 0.064 0.101 -0.294 0.628 OECD 
Misalignment 2260 0.032 0.164 -0.736 0.497 
Own calculations based on OECD 
data  
Credit growth 2551 0.054 0.077 -0.598 0.615 OECD 
Investment in housing 2457 0.059 0.020 0.015 0.151 OECD 
Home ownership rate change 1957 0.001 0.003 -0.050 0.020 OECD 
Real interest rate change 2343 -0.001 0.025 -0.167 0.148 OECD 
Share of working age pop. 2506 0.676 0.039 0.583 0.781 OECD 
Population growth 2502 0.007 0.005 -0.009 0.047 OECD 
GDP per capita growth 2507 0.019 0.025 -0.147 0.179 OECD 




Table A2: Long-run elasticities and error correction parameter estimates: house prices  
 
Country Income Long-term interest rate 
Error correction 
parameter Obs. 
AUS 0.367 (0.015) -4.152 (0.373) -0.026 (0.011) 154 
CAN 0.290 (0.014) -3.810 (0.389) -0.048 (0.019) 154 
CHE 0.141 (0.035) -2.009 (0.823) -0.021 (0.012) 150 
DEU -0.702 (0.031) 3.191 (0.319) -0.027 (0.031) 61 
DNK 0.132 (0.030) -6.454 (0.596) -0.024 (0.011) 154 
ESP 0.300 (0.029) -4.183 (0.492) -0.010 (0.006) 151 
FIN 0.208 (0.022) -2.143 (0.493) -0.024 (0.008) 154 
FRA 0.296 (0.025) -5.648 (0.564) -0.013 (0.005) 154 
GBR 0.403 (0.028) -4.464 (0.772) -0.014 (0.007) 150 
IRL 0.404 (0.015) -7.946 (0.448) -0.020 (0.016) 149 
ITA 0.216 (0.014) -1.761 (0.381) -0.052 (0.015) 154 
JPN 0.238 (0.040) 0.516 (0.429) -0.003 (0.005) 150 
KOR -0.206 (0.036) -1.978 (0.817) -0.040 (0.016) 91 
NLD 0.630 (0.031) -9.752 (0.846) -0.031 (0.008) 150 
NOR 0.351 (0.019) -5.087 (0.568) -0.017 (0.009) 154 
NZL 0.394 (0.025) -4.988 (0.556) -0.021 (0.006) 154 
SWE 0.201 (0.017) -7.778 (0.445) -0.022 (0.010) 154 
USA 0.202 (0.011) -2.557 (0.251) -0.005 (0.010) 154 
The columns “Income” and “Long-term interest rate” are the estimated long run elasticities based on dynamic OLS (DOLS). Dependent 
variable: log of house price index; independent variables: log of GDP per capita and real long run interest rate. The column “Error correction 
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Figure A2: Parameter estimates ± standard deviation for the energy price inflation 
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